University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 45
Number 1 Fall 2014

Article 5

2014

Recent Development: Barnes v. State: A Suspect's
Detention Did Not Evolve Into De Facto Arrest
When the Execution of a Warrant Was Delayed for
Three Hours; Police May Detain a Suspect After
the Warrant Execution if They Reasonably Suspect
Criminal Activity
Harrison Bliss

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bliss, Harrison (2014) "Recent Development: Barnes v. State: A Suspect's Detention Did Not Evolve Into De Facto Arrest When the
Execution of a Warrant Was Delayed for Three Hours; Police May Detain a Suspect After the Warrant Execution if They Reasonably
Suspect Criminal Activity," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 45 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol45/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
BARNES V. STATE: A SUSPECT’S DETENTION DID NOT
EVOLVE INTO DE FACTO ARREST WHEN THE
EXECUTION OF A WARRANT WAS DELAYED FOR THREE
HOURS; POLICE MAY DETAIN A SUSPECT AFTER THE
WARRANT EXECUTION IF THEY REASONABLY SUSPECT
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
By: Harrison Bliss
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a three-hour delay in the
execution of a warrant was reasonable and did not constitute de facto arrest.
Barnes v. State, 437 Md. 375, 394, 86 A.3d 1246, 1257 (2014). The court of
appeals also held that a short investigatory detention, following the execution
of the warrant, did not suggest de facto arrest, and therefore did not require
probable cause. Id. at 397, 86 A.3d at 1259. Finally, the court held that the
evidence collected from the search of an individual’s storage unit was
lawfully obtained because the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion
to detain the individual when he consented to the search. Id. at 399, 86 A.3d
at 1260.
On January 14, 2009, Prince George’s County Police discovered the
bodies of Seth Aidoo and Eunice Baah in Mr. Aidoo’s home, after receiving
a 911 call from a concerned friend. It was determined the victims were
likely murdered on January 12, 2009. During their investigation, detectives
discovered that Sheila Aidoo and her brother, Samuel Culley Jr. (“Culley”),
had previously lived with Mr. Aidoo. However, at the time of the murders,
Ms. Aidoo and Culley were living with Delford Mitchell Barnes (“Barnes”)
in Ms. Aidoo’s home.
Detectives further discovered that Culley had obtained a transponder to
enter Mr. Aidoo’s gated community while residing at Mr. Aidoo’s home.
Video surveillance showed Barnes’ vehicle using that same transponder to
enter the community approximately two weeks before the murders.
Additionally, a mini-van entered Mr. Aidoo’s gated community, using the
same transponder, on the evening of the murders.
On February 18, 2009, detectives obtained a warrant to collect Barnes’
DNA and fingerprints, as well as to search Ms. Aidoo’s residence and
Barnes’ car. The following evening, police stopped Barnes and asked him to
come to the station to execute the warrant for his DNA and fingerprints.
Barnes agreed and was transported to the police station. Upon arrival,
Barnes was placed in an interview room where the door remained unlocked
and Barnes was unrestrained.
Meanwhile, other detectives executed the search warrant for Ms. Aidoo’s
residence, which ultimately delayed police from taking Barnes’ DNA and
fingerprints for approximately three to four hours. After Barnes’ DNA and
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fingerprints were taken, Barnes was escorted to the restroom to wash his
hands. Upon returning to the interview room, police immediately questioned
Barnes about a storage unit receipt found at Ms. Aidoo’s residence. Barnes
confirmed that the storage unit belonged to him and gave the police consent
to search the unit approximately seven minutes after his return to the
interview room. The search of Barnes’ storage unit revealed a candle etched
with Mr. Aidoo’s address and several statements regarding Mr. Aidoo, such
as “Seth please die,” and “I want you to take a knife & kill yourself.” Barnes
was subsequently arrested and charged with premeditated murder.
Barnes filed a motion to suppress the candle, claiming that it was the
product of an unlawful detention and therefore was inadmissible. The
suppression court denied Barnes’ motion and Barnes was convicted on two
counts of first-degree murder. On appeal, the court of special appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding the delay to be reasonable, and
Barnes’ second detention lawful. Barnes petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The court of appeals applied a deferential standard of review, relying
solely on the record from the suppression hearing and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Barnes, 437 Md. at 389,
86 A.3d at 1254 (citing Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384, 30 A.3d 870 (2011)).
The factual findings of the suppression court were upheld because they were
not clearly erroneous; however, the court of appeals made its own
independent evaluation constitutional evaluation. Id. at 389, 86 A.3d at
1254-55 (citing State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 375 n. 3, 993 A.2d 25 (2010);
Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148–49, 12 A.3d 1238 (2011)).
The court of appeals began its analysis by concluding that any nonconsensual detention of a person constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment. Barnes, 437 Md. at 390, 86 A.3d at 1255. The court stated that
Fourth Amendment seizures fall into one of two categories. Id. First, a
formal or de facto arrest, requiring probable cause that the suspect was
involved in criminal activity. Id. (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
370 (2003)). Second, a more limited stop of an individual, requiring only
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968)).
In addressing whether the delay in the execution of the warrant for
Barnes’ DNA and fingerprints was reasonable, the court referred to the
testimony of two detectives from the suppression hearing, which showed that
no one was available to execute the warrant during the delay. Barnes, 437
Md. at 392-93, 86 A.3d at 1256-57. The court stated that its task was not to
speculate on whether police could have executed the warrant sooner, but
only to determine if the delay was reasonable. Id. at 394, 86 A.3d at 1257.
Ultimately, the court held that Barnes’ initial detention never evolved into de
facto arrest. Id. The delay in warrant execution was found to be reasonable
due to the lack of available detectives to carry it out. Id.
Additionally, the court of appeals addressed whether Barnes’ second
detention constituted de facto arrest without probable cause. Barnes, 437
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Md. at 394-95, 86 A.3d at 1257-58. Relying on Dunaway v. New York,
Barnes argued that the circumstances of his detention had the attributes of a
formal arrest, thus requiring probable cause. Id. at 395-96, 86 A.3d at 1258
(citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)). Rejecting this
argument, the court identified the crucial distinctions between an arrestee
being detained based on mere suspicion, as in Dunaway, and the detention of
an arrestee incident to the execution of a lawful warrant. Barnes, 437 Md. at
396, 86 A.3d at 1268.
The court of appeals disagreed finding that Barnes was lawfully detained
for three hours to execute a warrant, whereas Dunaway was held under
prolonged investigatory detention by police without a warrant or other
official grounds to detain him. Barnes, 437 Md. at 397, 86 A.3d at 1259.
The court held that Barnes was not under de facto arrest during the second
detention because it was brief and less intrusive than in Dunaway, and
therefore probable cause was not required. Id.
The court of appeals then addressed whether the detectives had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Barnes following the execution of
the warrant. Barnes, 437 Md. at 398, 86 A.3d at 1259. In emphasizing the
distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the court stated
that the former is a less demanding standard than the latter. Id. at 398, 86
A.3d at 1260 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). Based on
the evidence that initially allowed police to obtain the warrant for Barnes’
DNA and fingerprints, the court held that the detectives had reasonable
suspicion that Barnes was involved in the murders at the time they entered
the interview room to question Barnes about the storage locker. Id. at 39899, 86 A.3d at 1260. Because the detectives obtained Barnes’ consent to
search his locker during a lawful detention, the court held that all evidence
resulting from the search of his locker was admissible. Barnes, 437 Md. at
398-99, 86 A.3d at 1260.
In Barnes, the court of appeals held that a delay in the execution of a
search and seizure warrant is lawful if it is deemed reasonable. This ruling
makes it clear that the courts give police wide discretion to conduct
investigations in the manner they see fit. Such discretion discourages
defense counsel from challenging the reasonableness of a delay in the
execution of a warrant because it is unlikely that a court will find the delay
unreasonable. When delays such as the one in Barnes are deemed
reasonable, the likelihood for coercion increases. A suspect may be
convinced or browbeaten into giving police search consent or a confession
during a prolonged detention. This ruling shows that such a confession or
consent will likely be found to be valid which is troublesome because it
shows that the rights of criminal suspects have been eroded.

